Catholic Development Ethics Forty Years after *Populorum Progressio*: Cross-Cultural Revisions and the Prospects of Global Solidarity

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The ethics of integral human development, as it has evolved in the social teaching tradition of the Roman Catholic Church, has been a crucial dialogue partner of development theories and practices during the past four development decades. Its critique has not only triggered in the rich nations of the North serious efforts to rethink the ethics and praxis of development globally implemented thus far. But such rethinking has to meet the new concerns and development agenda of the poor peoples of the South, particularly in Asia. Catholic development ethics can continue to make a relevant contribution to global solidarity if it listens more attentively to these cross-cultural revisions and critically appropriate their insights.

Introduction

The year 2007 marked the fortieth year of *Populorum Progressio* (PP), Paul VI's encyclical that captured the imagination of the world as the first development decade was about to end. The year was also the official halfway point before the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals to reduce global poverty will reach the 2015 deadline. In the four decades of global efforts to give concrete form to the aspiration for total human development, Catholic development ethics, as it has evolved in the social teaching tradition of the Roman Catholic Church[1] and as practiced by numerous institutions, organizations and groups that draw inspiration

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from it, has been a crucial dialogue partner of development theorists and practitioners.

Against the horizon of these two timely coincidences, this paper will try to make a review of that dialogue highlighting lessons learned, lingering issues still to be adjudicated, and new challenges to be faced. This paper shall sketch (1) the evolution of the Catholic Church's ethics of development and (2) its reception across the continuum of development theories and strategies in the past four decades (1960-2000). This will be followed by a presentation of two cross-cultural efforts to rethink development ethics in view of the lessons learned, (3) one coming from the "center", that is to say, the North, (4) the other from the "periphery" or the South, particularly Asia.

1. The Evolution of Catholic Development Ethics in Church Social Teaching

Far from prescribing a monolithic and universal blueprint of global prosperity, the ethical discourse of the Catholic Church on development has evolved across the continuum of approaches of modern development theory and practice.[2] It has learned a lot from these approaches even as it has offered correctives to arrest their deficiencies.

1.1 John XXIII and the "Catch-Up" or "Trickle-Down" Model

If we take John XXIII as a starting point, the discourse began by endorsing the level of material progress and standard of living

1. The main documents of this tradition are found in David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon, eds., *Catholic Social Thought. The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1992). The documents used in this paper are: *Quadragesimo Anno* (QA), *Pacem in Terris* (PT), *Mater et Magistra* (MM), *Gaudium et Spes* (GS), *Populorum Progressio* (PP), Paul VI's Letter to the head of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (PCJP), *Octogesima Adveniens* (OA), *Justice in the World* (JW), *Laborem Exercens* (LE), *Libertatis Nuntius* (LN), *Libertatis Conscientia* (LC), *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (SRS) and *Centesimus Annus* (CA).

2. See Mary Hembrow Snyder, "Development," in *The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought*, ed. Judith Dwyer, (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1994), 278-282.

achieved by Western nations in the early 1960s for other nations to catch-up and imitate as an ideal. To hasten this process, the pope argued for capital infusion by rich nations. This could be in the form of direct financial aid to poor nations or foreign investment into their domestic markets so that they "will arrive at a degree of economic development which will enable every citizen to live in conditions more in keeping with their human dignity" (PT 122; MM 75, 164). But the endorsement is not at all unbridled. John XXIII carefully subordinates all of economic activity to the goal of social development (MM 73) and to the norm of distributive justice (MM 74). He also cautioned that aid from developed countries should not "seek to impose their own way of life" upon poor nations and "turn the prevailing political situation to their own advantage." Such attempts "would be but another form of colonialism" (MM 170-172; PT 125). Poor countries, he warns, should not follow the type of progress that "ignores spiritual values" and has "no concern at all for the just ordering of goods" (MM 176).

The Second Vatican Council through its Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World (1965) continues the late pontiff's cautious optimism. But more importantly, the document provides a religious horizon against which development must be seen. Referring to the level of material prosperity hitherto attained by Western developed nations, the council warns that "the human person is more precious for what he or she is than for what he or she has" (GS 35), and that human activity that develops the person and the human community is not an isolated nor autonomous process but part of the on-going work of God's creation (GS 57, 72). But *Gaudium et Spes*, not unlike John XXIII, appears to have overlooked that the economic progress of the West was largely dependent on the abundant supply of low cost primary resources from its former colonies. Both also "assumed too easily that the basic elements of Western development and its underpinning values," such as individualism and competitive work ethic, "are transcultural," and hence can be transplanted without harm to other cultural milieu.[3]

3. Donald Dorr, *The Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1992), 172-173.

1.2 Paul VI and the Model of "Integral Human Development"

The year 1967 saw the first systematic attempt by the church magisterium to participate in the development debate in the global arena. As the first development decade was about to end, Paul VI offered "certain basic standards by which we can measure to what extent changes brought about in society deserve to be called authentic human development"[4] through *Populorum Progressio*. Of primary importance is the view that development is a process that involves a series of transitions "from less human conditions to those which are more human" (PP 20). For those "without the minimum essential of life" development consists of the passage from their "lack of material necessities" to the "possession of necessities, victory over social scourges, the growth of knowledge, and the acquisition of culture." This condition empowers them to move to an "increased esteem for the dignity of others, cooperation for the common good, will for peace" which, in turn, enhances them to appreciate supreme values such as God and faith in Him (cf. PP 21, 6). For Paul VI, the meeting of basic needs is a fundamental prerequisite for the succeeding stages to happen.

Of equal importance is the view that for development to be authentic and integral, "it has to promote the good of every human person and of the whole human person" (PP 14). "The desire for necessities is legitimate, and work undertaken to obtain them is a duty." But this desire can harden into personal and collective greed which can undermine the value of solidarity, while the pursuit for possessions can lead to personal and collective avarice which could lead to a stifling materialism (cf. PP 18-19). In a true scale of values, it is legitimate "to seek to do more, to know more and have more" only in view of the "full human enhancement" of persons and groups (PP 6), "without one (person or group) making progress at the expense of another" (PP 44).

Distancing from the optimism of previous discourse, Paul VI would judge the Western model of development as far from ideal

4. Ibid., 181.

for less well-off peoples to catch up. A model of development "excessively engrossed in earthly affairs" and "principally aimed at the conquest of material prosperity" is not worth imitating. Instead "developing nations…must be able to assess critically, and eliminate those deceptive goods which would only bring about the lowering of the human ideal, and to accept those values that are sound and beneficial, in order to develop them alongside their own, in accordance with their own genius" (PP 41). Development must therefore aim at "complete humanism," one that is "open to the values of the spirit and to God" and "is conscious of a vocation which gives human life its true meaning" (PP 42).What is more interesting though is Paul VI's indictment of colonialism as the historical root of global poverty. Colonial politics, he says, cultivated a "small restricted group" enjoying "more in the exercise of power" while the remainder of the population is "deprived of all possibility of personal initiative and responsibility" (PP 9). Colonial economics have left behind an economy "bound up for instance with the production of one kind of crop whose market prices are subject to sudden and considerable variation" (PP 7). Colonial social construction has destroyed the natural cohesion of ethnic units such as the family or tribe, thus paving the way for a serious "conflict of generations" (PP 10). The cultural elements of colonial civilization tended to devalue "ancestral institutions and convictions" and "reject along with the traditions of the past all their human richness" (PP 10). Paul VI corrected the commonly held view that colonization brought peoples into the mainstream of civilization and that former colonies had much to gain than lose from their colonial masters

Equally strong is Paul VI's critical analysis of neo-colonialism as to why "rich peoples enjoy rapid growth whereas the poor develop slowly" and why "some produce a surplus of foodstuffs, others cruelly lack them" (PP 8). At the international level, it is evident "in the form of political pressures and economic suzerainty disguising as financial aid or technical assistance" that aims "at maintaining or acquiring complete dominance" (PP 52). It is as evident in "the trade between developed and underdeveloped economies" where "conditions are too disparate and the degrees of genuine freedom available too unequal" (PP 61) and "inequalities of economic power are excessive" (PP 58).

For Paul VI, these "glaring injustices that cry out to the heaven" (PP 32) are caused by the liberal capitalist system – the system "which considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, competition as the supreme law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right that has no limits and carries no corresponding social obligation" (PP 26). In a word, "individual initiative alone and the mere free play of competition could never assure successful development" (PP 33).

1.3 The Church's Interventions during the Second Development Decade

The Church's interventions during the second development decade are by far of less importance. The social discourse will shift from the emphasis on the importance of material prosperity to political participation as integral to development.[5] Chief of these documents are the message of Cardinal Maurice Roy, the head of the newly-created Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace (PCJP), to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (19 November 1970); Paul VI's encyclical *Octogesima Adveniens* (14 May 1971), and the Final Statement of the Second Synod of Bishops (30 November 1971).

In his letter to the United Nations Secretary-General at the beginning of the second development decade, the head of the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace, Maurice Cardinal Roy, calls attention to "some movement towards a new consensus" among development experts, particularly the growing consensus "that economic growth is an indispensable but not sufficient cause of full human development" (PCJP 10). The progress achieved in industrialized nations, which is strongly marked by an increase of possessions and comforts, is not only inadequate but also destructive for developing nations to imitate because circumstances and

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conditions vary from one place to another and from time to time (cf. PCJP 6-9). It has to be "complemented by the new ideas of social justice and participation" at the domestic and international level (cf. PCJP 15, 16-17).

Paul VI extends the argument "to allow each country to promote its own development," albeit "within the framework of cooperation free from any spirit of domination, whether economic or political" (OA 43). This can be done by "setting up of structures in which the rhythm of progress would be regulated with a view to greater justice, instead of accentuating inequalities and living in a climate of distrust and struggle which would unceasingly compromise peace" (OA 45). For development to be authentic it has "to pass from economics to politics" (OA 46).

To prove why it is opportune to make a shift, Paul VI speaks of "two forms of human dignity and freedom" that increasingly reverberate across peoples and cultures. They are the "aspiration to equality and the aspiration to participation" (OA 22) — aspirations that call for "a greater sharing in responsibility and decision-making" not only in the economy but also in all spheres of human society (cf. OA 46-47). Without equality and participation development will not be "the projection of a plan of action of society which is consistent in its concrete means and in its inspiration, and which springs from a complete conception of the human person's vocation and of its differing social expressions" (OA 25).

The 1971 Synod of Bishops would add two new themes crucial to the debate. First, development cannot be authentic if it fails to recognize the material limits of the biosphere and the imperative to save and preserve it "as a unique patrimony belonging to all mankind" (JW 8, 12; OA 21). As important as ecology is the Synod's bold proposal that, in the face of international systems of domination, development must be seen as a basic human right. The right to development (cf. JW 13-18), the bishops say, is the "dynamic interpenetration of all those fundamental human rights upon which aspirations of individuals and nations are based" (JW 15). If developing nations and regions do not attain liberation through the right to development, "there is a real danger that the conditions of life created by colonial domination may evolve into new forms of colonialism" (JW 16).

1.4 John Paul II and the Emphasis on Authentic Human Development

In 1987, towards the end of the third development decade, John Paul II sadly noted that "the hopes for development, at that time so lively, today appear very far from being realized" (SRS 12, 13). Continuing the church's insistence that the crisis is not merely economic or political but a moral if not a religious one, and building on the insights of previous church teachings, he summarizes six basic criteria by which development is to be judged as authentic or not.

For development to be authentic it should, first, be "human-centered", that is, it contributes to the realization of the vocation of persons as creative, responsible, loving individuals within a social context (cf. SRS 9, 28). Second, it is basically a human task, not without religious dimensions, because every phase of economic or cultural advancement is "a moment in the story that began at creation" (SRS 30). To arrest if not reverse the patterns of "maldevelopment" or "underdevelopment" is, in this sense, all the more urgent because these are violations of God's creative plan.

Third, inasmuch as development is a right, the "respect and promotion of human rights is its necessary condition and guarantee" (SRS 44). Of special relevance is that, fourth, development should foster and protect the right to culture as guarantee to the growth of peoples' innate potentials. Fundamental problems connected with development are ethical and cultural in character for it involves resisting the erosion of the best in one's moral heritage and ethnic characteristics either due to domination or the clash of values in the development process (cf. SRS 8).

Fifth, authentic development is "either all the nations of the world participate, or it will not be true development" at all (SRS 17), otherwise the unity of the human race will be compromised (cf. SRS 14). Lastly, so that development is sustainable for present and future generations, it should embrace environmental concern, which is "the responsible use of the elements of nature," and ecological consciousness, which is the "respect for beings which constitute the natural world" in view of their "mutual connection", "integrity" and "cycles" (SRS 26, 34).

Lest this set of criteria be misconstrued as "cautious spiritualizing,"[6] John Paul II also advocated a development strategy anchored on new fronts of solidarity as an "alternative to excessive dependence" on richer and more powerful countries (SRS 45). This entails "solidarity of the poor among themselves, solidarity with the poor to which the rich are called, solidarity among workers and with workers" (LC 89). The collective self-reliance is not however thoroughly specified as a "countervailing force" to struggle for justice in the "nexus of contradictions between rich and poor, powerful and vulnerable" and use it to move on the path of authentic development.[7] Be that as it may, he would nonetheless courageously call for the reform of current world trade, monetary and finance system (SRS 43) after having indicted them as "structures of sin" (SRS 16, 36).

2. Critical Reception of Catholic Development Ethics in the Continuum of Development Theories and Models

The interventions of the Catholic Church's teachings on integral human development sketched in the preceding have produced critical reception and points of convergence with development theories and models across the continuum of four decades of development debate.

2.1 Priority of Basic Needs and Self-reliance

The church's earliest interventions helped expose two fallacies in the assumption so dominant in the first decade of development: first, that the level of prosperity achieved by western developed nations is the model for all to follow; and second, that economic

6. Mary H. Snyder, "Development," 282.

7. Stefano Zamagni, "The Documents of the FABC on Poverty and Development: An Assessment" (A paper presented during the International Symposium on Poverty and Development: The Call of the Catholic Church in Asia, 22-25 February 1994, Quezon City, Philippines), 15.

growth unfolds by way of certain fixed stages which every country has to go through ultimately leading to the benefit of everyone.[8] The church's corrective to this idealization of western progress and dominance of "catch-up" or "trickle-down" economics converges well with the "basic needs" model and "self-reliance" strategy first conceived by development experts in the Cocoyoc Document of 1974.[9]

In the "basic needs" model, according to the document, meeting the poor people's most elementary needs is a matter of priority. To enable them to pass from misery towards the possession of necessities is a fundamental requirement for them to continuously move from less to more human conditions. The "self-reliance" strategy, on the other hand, encouraged developing countries to conceive a hierarchy of basic needs and experiment on development strategies that are in harmony with their own cultural values rather than imitate western style of progress. Against ethnocentrism lurking behind earlier development models, the strategy advocated reliance on traditional wisdom for it may have the inherent dynamism to produce indigenous forms of modernity.

2.2 The Structural Causes of Underdevelopment

It is also clear that the church's warnings on "new forms of colonialism" and its condemnation of unjust trade relations as "structures of sin" converge well with the analysis of dependency theory critical to development politics of rich nations.[10]

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8. See W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

9. See R. Heckel, *Self-Reliance* (Vatican: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 1978); D. Goulet, *Mexico: Development Strategies for the Future* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983); and H. Sangmeister, "Grundbedürfnisse, grundbedürfnis-orienterte Entwicklungsstrategien," in *Lexicon der Dritte Welt,* ed. D. Nohlen, (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), 286-289.

10. Economists and social scientists in Latin America used the theory during the mid-1960s and found its way into the analytic lens of the 1971 Synod of Bishops and Paul VI's *Octogesima Adveniens*. See A. Boeckh, "Dependencia-Theorien," in *Lexicon der Dritte Welt*, ed. D. Nohlen, (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), 162-166; M. Snyder, "Development," 279.

Underdevelopment, the theory says, is the inevitable result when the very few rich nations in the "center" maneuver directly or indirectly economic, social, and financial mechanisms to favor their own interests, thus making the very many poor nations in the "periphery" dependent on them. The "center" perpetuates the dependence in the domestic affairs of poor nations by forging internal political alliances with "domestic elites" whose duty is to ensure a stable climate for their interests, often through repressive measures carried out by the politico-military apparatus of the state and/or through the more subtle cultural instrumentality of media and education. The theory anchors radical change on the collective self-reliance of poor nations to act as a countervailing force opposite their dependence.

Pointing out the failure of three development decades, the 1992 Human Development Report echoes the theory, thus: (a) that "economic growth does not automatically improve people's lives"; (b) that "rich and poor nations compete in the global market as unequal partners"; (c) that "global markets do not operate freely"; (d) that "the world community needs policies in place to provide a social safety net for poor nations and poor people"; and (e) that "industrial and developing countries have the opportunity to design a new global compact."[11]

2.3 New and More Integral Measurements of Development

The critical reception and convergence can be verified best on the extent to which development strategists have revised its tools of measurement. The use of the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Political Freedom Index (PFI), which reflects the church's advocacy for the type of development that gives priority to "being" over "having", are good examples.

If human development is more than economic growth, the "gross national product (GNP) per capita" is a seriously flawed measurement of progress. The GNP, unlike the HDI, does not consider major elements of "quality of life" (health, education, nutrition, accessibility

11. *Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 3-11.

of resources, life expectancy, etc.) as human development indicator, not to mention its incapacity to value the ecological costs of growth, the real purchasing power of national currencies, the disparities of social classes and the urban-rural gap, and the volume of economic activity happening outside the market. In embracing social, cultural, ecological and gender-sensitive elements, the HDI implies that, rather than a goal, economic growth is a means to develop human capabilities and enlarge people's choices. [12]

The other set of indicators[13] in current global use reflects the church's insistence that the respect and promotion of human rights is the necessary condition and guarantee of the right to human development (cf. SRS 44). The PFI, for instance, consists of indicators that value personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of opportunity.[14] The Freedom House (FH) concept is another example. Here a particular country is evaluated according to its observance of political rights and civil liberties.[15] The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is also used to measure the gravity of human rights violations committed by public authorities against citizens.[16] The assumption is that governments which do not suppress, imprison, torture or murder its citizens because of their political views provide the political condition on which human development is possible.

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12. The convergence of views is very significant. See John Paul II's SRS 15; Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?," *Economic Journal* 93 (1983): 745-762; the *1992 Human Development Report*, 12-24; and Ingomar Hauchler and Paul Kennedy, eds., *Global Trends: The World Almanac of Development and Peace* (New York: Continuum, 1994), 56-60.

13. See Ingomar Hauchler and Paul Kennedy, eds., *Global Trends,* 87-94.

14. See the *1992 Human Development Report*, 26-33.

15. Indicators of political rights observance are "free and fair elections, major role of the elected parliament in the process of political decision-making, open competition between political parties, freedom of associations, and protection of minorities." Civil liberties include "freedom of religion, the press, association and meeting, trade unions, the right to property and equality before the law, protection from political terror and from corruption of the government." See *Ibid.*, 93.

16. In a scale of 1 ("rare") to 5 ("worst"), countries were rated according to the prevalence and gravity of violations of human rights perpetrated by the state. See *Ibid.*

Although it is difficult to establish whether more freedom leads to more development or the other way around, what is certain is that economic and social rights as well as the rights of peoples to development cannot do well if political rights and civil freedoms of the individual are set aside. Their promotion and protection through juridical and institutional guarantees ensure justice and participation.

2.4 Sustainability as New Principle of Action

Perhaps the last but not the least important point of convergence is the concept of "sustainability". Ever since the 1987 Bruntland Commission urgently demanded the acceptance of the concept as a principle of action in development policies, its eventual adoption by states in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and its integration in the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, sustainable development has convincingly shown that "the production and consumption pattern of the industrial world has been the decisive cause of global environmental destruction."[17] Not unlike the church's emphasis, sustainability serves as an indictment of the lingering belief to anchor development primarily on quantitative growth even as it embraces both environmental concern and ecological consciousness.

Growth cannot be sustained because it refers to "quantitative expansion in the scale of the physical dimensions of the economic system" - dimensions which are finite and non-growing. If development is freed from its obligations to growth, it becomes a process of "qualitative change of a physically non-growing economic system in dynamic equilibrium with the environment."[18] Development, in this purview, can meet the current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own. Responsibility becomes two-fold: one that is exercised towards guaranteeing the life-chances of present and future generations, the other towards preserving satisfactory environmental and ecological

17. Ingomar Hauchler and Paul Kennedy, eds., *Global Trends*, 290.

18. Herman Daly and John Cobb, Jr., *For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy towards Community, the Environment and Sustainable Future* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 71-72; 75-76.

conditions by avoiding excessive demands on resources. In this move beyond anthropocentric thinking and acting, Catholic development ethics is poised to assist in the changes needed to shape a new planetary civilization.[19]

3. Rethinking Catholic Development Ethics from the Center

The past four development decades have seen serious efforts to rethink development ethics and praxis in view of lessons learned. Such rethinking, in particular, is very much alive in the discourse of nations on which Catholic social teaching has placed the greater share of moral responsibility to aid the weak nations, to rectify inequitable trade relations, and to bring about a world where no one group makes progress at the expense of another. (cf. PP 44) There have been, at least, five main directions of this ethical rethinking, namely: (3.1) the ethical consideration of enlightened self-interest, (3.2) the socialization of the global market economy, (3.3) the reconsideration of the principle of solidarity, (3.4) the juridical-institutional promotion of human rights in a global scale, and (3.5) the case for ecological sustainability.

3.1 The Case for "Enlightened Self-interest"

The evolution of development theory and practice has been essentially founded on the self-interest of industrialized nations. Its first three decades had been tied to the logic of "cold war" between nations in the eastern and western blocs. History bears the record of its destructive consequences particularly on poor nations that played proxy to their conflict. With the change in global configurations of power in the new millennium, it is deemed necessary to reconstruct

19. For a summary of contributions and limitations of Catholic social teachings on the environment, see Mary Evelyn Tucker, "Globalization and the Environment," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope*, eds. John Coleman and William Ryan, (New York: Orbis, 2005), 101-112.

its normative foundation still on self-interest but this time one that is "enlightened" and "long-term."[20]

According to this approach, it is to the self-interest of a nation to establish mutual cooperation with others not through spontaneous acts of exchange but by the calculation of common, durable and long-term interests. Such calculation is however "enlightened," in that it is governed by a set of rules arrived at through multilateral agreements that, as a consequence, constitute legitimate expectations of behavior, particularly in trade, security and environment. The approach is based on the fact that, with the triumph of western capitalism, there is but a "one world" of nations in interdependence and an unprecedented abundance of opportunities for each to access the world market.

The reinvention of old regional trade blocs (e.g., Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the creation of new ones (e.g., Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, North America Free Trade Area, Mercado Comun del Sur) as well as the increase in the membership of security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of global trade organization such as the World Trade Organization are examples. Enlightened self-interest is also evident in the ease to invoke the notion of "international community" in the face of what is perceived as a global threat of terrorism or environmental disaster.

3.1.1 The Limits and Dangers

What essentially matters in this reconstruction is the reliable and long-term calculation of interests, certainly not an ethic of disinterested and unconditional global social and political responsibility. Moral intuitions do not underpin the reconstruction; they merely serve to ward off potential dangers and point out chances of cooperation. This brings into light the ethical question on whether or not social

20. Here we are appropriating Andre Habish and Karl Homann, "Der Ertrag der Kooperationen: Institutionenethische Zugänge zur Nord-Süd Problematik," in *Signale der Solidarität. Wege christlicher Nord-Süd-Ethik*, eds. Andre Habisch and Ulrich Pöner, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994), 113-137, esp. 114-126; henceforth, *Signale der Solidarität*.

institutions in politics or in the economy can be ethical and efficacious if the participants (e.g., states, nations) act from self-interest. Is the calculation of interest sufficient enough to lay the foundations for all peoples to be able to really participate on an equal footing in the process of socialization?

For some the reply is in the negative.[21] For instance, the assumption of a "one world" is not a given empirical fact. It is as yet a normative concept to be verified in history through ethical investigation. What is rather an historical fact is that, after the end of the East-West conflict, the number of poor nations and regions systematically excluded from the "world market" has increased because they have become superfluous or unnecessary for the existence of the rich nations in the world market economy. The approach is full of moral risks because its descriptive theory of interdependence, with self-interest as its chief motivating factor, masks the degree to which poor nations and peoples that are no longer relevant to the interest of industrialized nations are actually sinking in the mud of their disinterest.

The case for enlightened self-interest is also morally dangerous from a political point of view of nations that hope for modernization as they aspire for freedom from scarcity and want. The threat of environmental destruction is, for instance, high on the agenda of the nations in the North. But in contexts where poverty, hunger and disease are a daily occurrence the interest to protect the environment has hardly a positive meaning or immediate urgency. It is correct that, according to the theory of a "systemic world," a change in one place of the globe can affect other regions. But when poor nations are forced or exhorted to support programs conceived, planned, funded and led by the industrialized nations so that the effects of their activities will not be disadvantageous to the survival if not

21. For this, see the critique by Peter Rottländer, "Vom Eigeninteresse zur Moral? Überlegungen zur ethisch-normativen Grundlegung von Entwicklungspolitik," in *Signale der Solidarität,* 153-180; and Gerard Kruip, "Armutsbekämpfung und 'nachhältige Entwicklung': der notwendige Beitrag der reichen Staaten des Nordens," in *Brennpunkt Sozialethik. Theorien, Aufgaben, Methoden,* eds. Marianne Heimbach-Steins, Andreas Lienkamp and Joachim Wiemeyer, (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 367-384; henceforth, *Brennpunkt Sozialethik.*

preservation of the North's level of affluence, one cannot help but see its potential anti-humanism.

The moral danger of an ecological self-interest that hides behind a politics of survival is that poor nations still fighting against poverty, hunger and disease become all the more deprived of the emancipatory content of modernization, particularly the full blooming of their humanity through their liberation from scarcity and want.

From a social point of view, self-interest serves well the current form of politics waged by the North as it functions to stave off migration in order to preserve its present state of material prosperity and security. Narrowing the international prosperity gap may not be a matter of justice for industrialized nations but the preservation of their own long-term interests. The moral danger is, development politics grounded on an ethos of "negative self-interest" or aversion from strangers, will, in the long run, corrode every form of moral sensibility. It cannot bridge "the social gap between islands of prosperity and regions of poverty which continues to widen as many developing nations are becoming less and less able to provide their ever younger and fast-growing populations with work and food."[22]

3.1.2 The Poor as Primary Casualty of Enlightened Self-interest

Despite its strategic advantage and dominance in current global debate, the range of a reconstructed ethics of development based on enlightened and long-term self-interest is insufficient. The first casualty is the poor because the approach does not have any basis at all to seriously take the poor peoples and nations as subjects with rights and dignity. This ethical deficit does not however signal a revival of ethnocentric and imperialistic impulses so central in previous development policies. It is rather based, and ironically at that, on the

22. Ingomar Hauchler and Paul Kennedy, eds., *Global Trends*, 123. For a cogent ethical reflection from the vantage of Catholic social thought on the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons, see Lluis Magrina, "Refugees in the 21st Century: Can We Find a Solution?" *Cristianisme i Justicia* 123 (October 2006): 1-32.

appreciation of the diversity of contexts and respect of the plurality of cultures in the world.

Because contexts that breed poverty or hunger vary and are complex and cultural resources to overcome them differ, a moral consensus at a global scale as to how to overcome them is not as tenable as the strategic calculation of interests mutually shared by a rich nation with the poor ones. This respect for particularity and appreciation of plurality has therefore functioned as a tool to conveniently legitimize the Northern hemisphere's official policy of distantiation and retreat from its moral responsibility towards the many nations in the poor South. This explains why official development engagements of the North unto the South are very much dictated by the strategic calculation of its own interests, priorities and chances posturing as global. Here the preferential option for the poor finds no moral and political relevance.

3.1.3 But is self-interest morally necessary?

While self-interest may not be a morally sufficient basis and motivation to address the current magnitude of global underdevelopment, it may not also be correct to simply assume that a degree of self-interest is not morally necessary at all.

There is no doubt, for instance, that solidarity for poor nations needs to gain acceptance and consensus among the citizens and governments of industrialized nations as a matter of global justice. But for justice to be truly efficacious for poor nations, that moral consensus of the citizenry needs to be mainstreamed into the formal frameworks and procedures of the politics of rich nations. That can be achieved if citizens of rich nations succeed in showing that it would be to the self-interest of their politicians and key decision-makers to bring their moral sense high on the public agenda for legislation and/or policy-making. If they refuse to do so, it would be to the interest of the citizenry not to give their mandate to politicians during elections or to continue vigilant critique as they perform their public office.

In this sense a degree of self-interest seems necessary so that moral values, impulses and principles - which are very general in

nature – are not lost in the process of consensus-building and become concretized into official policies and plans of action.

3.2 The Case for a "Socially-oriented Global Market Economy"

The first three decades of development saw the rivalry of capitalist and communist ways of organizing the economy. The recent two decades, however, which began with the crumbling of the communist system, saw the one option of embracing the capitalist system as *the* key to economic progress. But as the euphoria over the victory of capitalism soon died down, the need for a new global economic order that ensures the chances of developing nations to participate became more evident.

To answer that need is the type of economy that values the instrumentalities of entrepreneurial initiative, the spirit of competition, and the dynamics of the market, but at the same time, strongly orients these instrumentalities toward social and ecological goals. This is achieved by the establishment of juridical framework and mechanisms though which poor nations can participate on an equal footing in the decision-making processes relevant to the economy. The proposal therefore aims to fashion an economic order by adopting a socially-oriented market economy in a global scale.[23]

3.2.1 The Moral Imperative of Global Rules

The proposal hinges on "the market economy (as)…by far the best known means for the realization of solidarity of all"[24] if, and only if, governed by "rules of the game" that are globally agreed and enforced. To level the playing field is most urgent because of at

23. See Franz Furger, "Weltwirtschaftliche Entwigklung: ökonomisch effizient, theoretisch-wissenschaftlich begründet, ethisch verantwortet," in *Signale der Solidarität,* 49-67.

24. Karl Homann, "Ethik und Ökonomik. Zur Theoriestrategie der Wirtschaftsethik," in *Im Dienst der Armen. Entwicklungsarbeit als Selbstvollzug der Kirche*, eds. Thomas Fliethmann and Claudia Lücking-Michel, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1992), 9-30; here at 14.

least two cases that have suffocated the economies of developing nations. On the one hand, there is the "protectionism" of traditional industrialized nations against the "newcomers" in international trade. There is, on the other hand, the efficient networking of global corporations doing business in developing nations through cheap labor and exploitation in the absence of laws and, where present, their lack of implementation.

"In other words, the regime of free trade, taken by itself, is no longer able to govern international relations," to borrow the words of Paul VI, given present conditions that "are too disparate and the degrees of freedom available too unequal" (cf. PP 58-61). Hence, the repeal of protectionist policies would give a fair chance for domestic macro-economies and the "market economies from below" (or the micro-initiatives of small entrepreneurs in developing countries) to level the playing field.[25] Meanwhile, the creation of labor legislations and standards that go beyond national interests and the corresponding international labor authorities that will enforce them could provide a countervailing force to the tremendous power of networked corporations.

To date, efforts to correct these fundamental defects of a market economy to make it more efficacious hinge on the global networking of solidarity movements of, by and for the poor nations. Although their mandate in official global platforms such as the United Nations is at the moment reduced to the status of consultation, they have nevertheless achieved modest gains. But their efforts cannot have substantial impact without global structures and institutions that are political and juridical in nature to govern the market economy. Indeed non-state actors are crucial in "the art of subversive diplomacy"[26] but state actors and governments play the most crucial role because, as yet, they alone have the political mandate to represent their citizens.

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25. For their status in the Asian contexts, see Antonio Ledesma and Karl Osner, eds., *Ways and Steps towards Solidarity* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988).

26. Non-Governmental Organizations have been referred to as "the third force", "the new actors in international politics", "the nucleus of international civil society", "a fundamental form of representation closer to the people" or the school in "the art of subversive diplomacy." See Christian Wernicke, "Barfuss auf dem Roten Teppich," *Die Zeit* 11 (März 1995), 5.

In view of its reliance on the participation of poor nations in decision-making processes, the case for a socially-oriented global market economy may stand to pave the way for what would rightly be called *globale Demokratiesierung*.[27] If democratic participation succeeds beyond the borders of nation-states, not only the chances of poor nations to fairly participate in the processes of global decision-making will increase, but also such high level and new quality of political processes become safe from every attempt or form of manipulative control that Catholic development ethics have repeatedly condemned.[28]

3.2.2 The Insufficiency of Justice as Formal Procedure

The task of orienting a global market economy towards social goals that promote the common good of all nations would seem to require the institutionalization of justice not merely as a formal procedure but more so in terms of its material content.

Without doubt, justice, as formal procedure, is crucial to satisfy the ideals of a free and participative deliberation as nations attempt to achieve a high degree of consensus on the rules of the game in a global market economy.[29] Procedural justice is very crucial because the will or concerns of citizens can be distorted by state and/or non-state actors in the various levels of decision-making. Given the

27. This is the view of Friedhelm Hengsbach und Matthias Möhring-Hesse, "Globale Gerechtigkeit durch interkulturelle Sensibilität," in Andre Habisch und Ulrich Pöner, eds., *Signale der Solidarität*, 181-206, esp. 194-201. For a similar urgency to globalize democracy, see M. Dolors Oller I Sala, "A Future for Democracy: A Democracy for World Governability," *Cristianisme i Justicia* 113 (February 2004): 1-32.

28. See PP 56-61, OA 43-44, SRS 43, and CA 58. A socially-oriented global market economy is a concretization most approximate to the ethical demands of Catholic social teaching, says W. Ockenfels, "Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus der Perspektive der Katholischen Soziallehreund einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft," in Andre Habisch und Ulrich Pöner, eds., *Signale der Solidarität,* 69-87.

29. For the urgency to change the rules of the game, see Gonzalo Fanjul Suarez, "Stacked Cards: Trade and Struggle against Poverty," *Cristianisme i Justicia* 119 (May 2005) 1-31 and Marta Arias and Jose M. Vera, "World Bank and IMF: For the Aid of Poor Countries?" *Cristianisme i Justicia* 106 (September 2002): 1-32.

asymmetry of information which is crucial to deliberation and decision-making, consensus in the international level could be as asymmetrical. Even the consent to an agreement can be, on the side of the economically or politically weak country, a choice not of the desirable good but of the lesser evil. In the past four decades of development, most if not all poor nations, after the repudiation of their colonial status, could only declare their consent to the global economic institutions through their membership.

Be that as it may, the type of justice demanded on the global scale cannot be solely specified by formal procedures. Justice, specified according to a set of material criteria, is a necessity if we are to have a global market economy firmly anchored on moral grounds.[30] The first in the set of criteria is the "justice of benefits" (*Leistungsgerechtigkeit*). In the context of development assistance, justice demands that the evaluation whether something is beneficial and to what extent it is a benefit should be determined by the one who asks for it, not by the one who gives it.[31] As important as the first is the "justice of opportunities" (*Chancengerechtigkeit*). Without the adequate provision of the elementary factors of economic life (e.g., capital, knowledge, technology, etc.) poor nations, tremendously gifted with human resources, never have concrete chances to participate in the global market on equal terms with the rich ones.[32]

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30. This section is indebted to Joachim Wiemeyer, "Die Weltwirtschaftsordnung aus sozialethischer Sicht," in *Brennpunkt Sozialethik*, 347-366; also see Joachim Wiemeyer and Franz Furger, "Ethische Reflexionen zur Weltwirtschaftsordnung," in *Lateinamerika und die Katholische Soziallehre. Teil II: Die Armut. Herausforderung für die Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung*, eds. Peter Hünnermann and Juan Carlos Scannone, (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1993), 259-289.

31. The assessment of the necessary assistance is "not only drawn up in terms of the generosity and the available wealth of donor nations, but also conditioned by the real needs of the receiving countries and the use to which the financial assistance can be put" (PP 54). It is also necessary that in evaluating the consequences of the decisions of assistance agencies, "sufficient consideration" is given to "peoples and countries which have little weight in the international market, but which are burdened by the most acute and desperate needs" (CA 58).

32. "In fact, for the poor (nations), to the lack of material goods has been added a lack of knowledge and training which prevents them from escaping their state of humiliating subjection…It seems therefore that the chief problem is that

The "justice of needs" (*Bedarfsgerechtigkeit*) comes next. The level of destitution unto which poor peoples have fallen demands the prior fulfillment of their legitimate elementary needs and basic social services, while the all too often abrupt changes in the world economy, besides the horrific consequences of natural disasters, necessitate a global mechanism that prevent them from falling into further absolute destitution.[33] "Ecological justice" (*Ökologischegerechtigkeit*) comes last but not the least, in that sustainability of the needs of present and future generations is arrived at, on the one hand, through structural adjustments in industrialized nations in view of the catastrophic dangers posed by their extreme use of resources and, on the other hand, through access of poor countries to ecologically sound technologies in view of their poverty-related environmental destruction.

In summary, the case for a socially-oriented global market economy does not appear to be a globalization of the type of capitalism that Catholic development ethics has strongly condemned or rejected.[34] The market can be a moral and efficacious instrument for development, insofar as the democratic participation of poor nations in the making of global decisions and policies is guaranteed and to the extent that the material content of justice, not simply global economic or financial growth, is specified and implemented

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of gaining fair access to the international market, based not on the unilateral principle of the exploitation of natural resources of these countries but on the proper use of human resources" (CA 33).

33. The free market is most efficient for utilizing resources and responding needs that are solvent and "capable of obtaining a satisfactory price. But there are human needs which find no place in the market. It is a strict duty of justice and truth not to allow fundamental needs human needs to remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those burdened by such needs to perish" (CA 34).

34. Cf. PP 26, CA 35. John Paul II seems to echo the social market proposal: "If by capitalism is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative…If by capitalism is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed by a strong juridical framework…then the reply is certainly in the negative." (CA 42)

by global institutions as the primary criteria of measuring success or failure in the creation of a good society.[35]

3.3 The Case for a Reconsidered Notion and Praxis of "Solidarity"

Another important approach to rethink development ethics is hinged on a reconsidered notion and praxis of solidarity. It aims to transpose the preferential option for the poor from the too limited confines of interpersonal charity into the structures and institutions of international community. The rethinking consists in the argumentation that, if rich nations would wish to express solidarity for poor peoples, they have to waive some of their collective rights if not limit some of their claims in favor of the legitimate needs of these peoples. To impose limitations upon one's rights and claims is seen as a concrete and strategic expression of solidarity so that those who have less in life will have more.

But on what moral grounds should rich nations impose such limits upon their level of prosperity and style of life? The project to provide a moral basis for solidarity has at least three directions. Solidarity, many would say, is but a fidelity to one's social nature as a human person. Others would consider the common risks humanity shares, particularly those posed by ecological destruction, as a firm moral motivation. Not a few, however, would focus on revulsion towards human suffering as solidarity's stable moral anchor.

3.3.1 Solidarity Based on the Social Nature of the Human Person

According to the Christian hermeneutic of solidarity (cf. SRS 38-40), human persons are in essence social beings. On the one hand, they are oriented neither towards isolation nor division but towards

35. See Adela Cortina, "Challenges of Economic Activity in a Global World" in James Keenan (ed.), *Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church* (New York/London: Continuum, 2007), 20-28; Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor, 1999); and Dennis Goulet, *Development Ethics at Work* (London/New York: Routledge, 2006).

interdependence, cooperation and communion. On the other hand, they are neither components of a collectivity nor individual aggregates of a greater and more important whole but are individuals with inherent dignity. The firm and persevering commitment to promote the good that enhances the dignity of each one within the ambit of human communion is called solidarity. Actions and attitudes that are to the contrary, such as individualism or collectivism as well as egoism or totalitarianism, constitute the betrayal of the social nature of human beings.

Solidarity in the Christian appropriation has undergone considerable expansion of meaning and application. For a time it correctly functioned as the norm mid-way the individualistic ethos of liberal capitalism and the collectivist impulses of communism. Later on as the human rights ethos became more and more universal it came to be associated with promotion or defense of the collective right of peoples to development. There was a period when it was associated with the workers movement and was thus interpreted as any form of consolidation of forces from within for the better advancement of legitimate rights and claims. In contexts where the radical contribution of liberation theology made great impact, solidarity meant the praxis of preferential option for the poor and was promoted as a moral virtue and a political act of discipleship. Solidarity is employed lately to raise moral awareness on the common inheritance of humankind in the face of global environmental threats or ecological risks.

Solidarity based on the social nature of human beings suffers from two limitations. First, solidarity as a moral option for the poor is usually grounded on the theological narrative of God's special predilection to the *anawim* of history. Theological or religious justification of a moral commitment such as solidarity may not be appealing to individuals and groups who have neither linkage with nor derive inspiration from religious or theological narratives. For those who may find it appealing, they have yet to contend that the religious justification of the moral duty to bridge the North-South chasm cannot be a monopoly of one religious hermeneutic. For this reason, solidarity would stand a better chance of being internalized into the collective conscience of peoples if it is grounded on the praxis of social agents and their movements that bear the ethos of

care and attention for the poor as inspired by or connected with their respective moral communities and religious traditions.[36]

Second, solidarity cannot be readily acceptable as a universal norm of moral responsibility if it remains argued on a purely philosophical or metaphysical basis. The greatest test for a moral norm is to acquire precise relevance as an applicable strategy or integral component of a political framework of action. Solidarity as a norm has to rely on an accurate and comprehensive analysis of the social and historical conditions which it tries to address in order to gain such relevance. For this reason, solidarity is best advanced when it is given form and content not solely by a metaphysics of social nature of human beings but also by the concrete (in)human conditions based on empirical data and historical evidence.

3.3.2 Solidarity Based on the Evidence of a Global Society at Risk

This is precisely the point of the next strand of interpretation. It gives form and content to solidarity by starting with an empirical verification of the problems and destruction relative to the social evolution of the world as propelled by western model of modernization. Evidence gained from four development decades already demonstrates the destructive effects of the ethnocentrism of western modernity, the idealization of technological-industrial style of progress, and the blatant dichotomy made between tradition and modernity.

What is striking in this proposal is for modernity to systematically confront itself and the crisis, conflicts and dangers it has spawned so that from there it can develop a theory of social evolution upon which a reinterpretation of solidarity can be made. Called *reflexive Modernisierung*, this form of ethical self-criticism has led modernity to see itself as the culprit, inasmuch as empirical verification has convincingly shown that in the social evolution of the world there is a historical correlation between economic advancement and ecological regression. Because of modernity we all now live in a

36. See P. Rottländer, "Vom Eigeninteresse zur Moral?," 179-180.

global society at risk (*globalen Risikogesellschaft*) composed of endangered communities (*Gefährdungsgemeinschaften*).[37]

This global fact erases the contextual difference between North and South even as it abrogates the contrast between present and future generations and terminates the social distinction between producers and consumers. The violence of the risks posed goes beyond the protective zones of national states and could no longer be sufficiently explained by the rules of causality, sin and responsibility. All this signal an end to every form of distantiation and puts all nations under the moral compulsion to forge solidarity for themselves and the future generation. Solidarity, in this sense, is "forced solidarity" (*Zwangssolidaritäten*). All peoples are its proponents being members of endangered communities even as the global society at risk becomes everybody's moral frame of reference.

To argue for solidarity based on the evidence of ecological risks is significant. Up until recently ethical demands derive from an ecological consideration tend to be merely juxtaposed with the exigencies of development. Growth, for instance, is still an obsession, only that it is tempered by the slogan of sustainability. But given the actual and potential harmful effects of modernization hitherto conceived, it seems current development theory and practice does not need a mechanism of moderation but an entirely new framework if not orientation - one that may radically put into question its basic assumptions and challenge it to break new grounds for and on behalf of the survival of many nations.

In this light, "forced solidarity" by itself cannot seem to hold solid moral ground if it is to generate a genuine commitment for the universal common good. Strategic and calculating posture of enlightened self-interest can also hide behind the veil of ecological risks. Ecological solidarity, if carried out, for instance, through an equal distribution of costs for environmental preservation, may slide into the slippery slope for nation-states to abrogate their sovereignty to the use of air, water, earth and other life-forms in their respective

37. We are following the discussion in Hans-Joachim Höhn, "Zwangssolidaritäten. Entwicklungspolitik im Kontext einer globalen Risikogesellschaft," in Andre Habisch und Ulrich Pöner, eds., *Signale der Solidarität,* 139-152.

territories. In such scenario the material development of poor peoples and nations, particularly their need of technology and resources, as well as the priority of their needs over the others may simply disappear in the global agenda. There must be a way whereby the step from exclusive interest toward global solidarity can be made at once on ethical and empirical grounds.

3.3.3 Solidarity and the Negative Experience of Human Suffering

The third hermeneutic of solidarity seeks to do just that by grounding it on the normative character of the experience of human suffering.[38] As a category of moral experience, human suffering has two interactive poles, namely negative experience (*negative Erfahrung*) and compassion (*Mitleiden*). The negative experience refers to the state of affairs which negates the fundamental aspirations of human beings. It can lead to a spontaneous revulsion by those who experience the negation and opens up a horizon of values and goals which give them direction for action. Compassion or "suffering with" consists of the moral sensibility and action to enter into and participate in the life of the victims when one is confronted by their suffering. Solidarity, in this view, is at the nexus where the revulsion by those who suffer the negative experience and the compassion of those who suffer with them intersect.

It is interesting to observe that revulsion towards negative experience is as universal as the human capacity for compassion. This universality is verifiable in the particularity of cultures and contexts. First of all, cultures attempt in various ways to provide answers or explanations to suffering and evil. Second, cultures have mechanisms that repress if not manipulate, consciously or unconsciously, alienation or suffering in varying degrees, sometimes even to the point of legitimizing inaction and making people passively internalize a collective guilt of their suffering. Cultures also have resources to resist and struggle against negative experiences as had been

38. This is the view of Johannes Müller, "Mit-Leiden als Grundlage mitmenschlicher Solidarität," in Ibid., 207-222.

exemplified by the history of protest movements of the poor and oppressed. Finally, cultures possess aesthetic resources such as art and literature that provide narrative of the historical forms of negation and offer liberating horizons and utopian visions.

In the case of underdevelopment, concrete suffering is almost always the universal signature of unfulfilled elementary human needs. If suffering becomes normative in development theory and praxis, solidarity will acquire a new basis in moral knowledge and motivation for action. On the one hand, solidarity will be based on the knowledge of the concrete evil of human suffering of particular peoples and nations, rather than on the philosophical concreteness that human beings are by nature, or *a priori*, social. On the other hand, the capacity for solidarity is motivated by the revulsion against suffering and compassion for its victims, neither by some self-interest that is enlightened nor by a solidarity that is forced.

Freed from mere philosophical concreteness, the praxis of solidarity will acquire dynamism from the socio-historical dialectic between revulsion to suffering and compassion for victims. That will unleash creative energies for new forms and networks of solidarity which no philosophical or theological theory can fully anticipate. Freed from the mere calculation of risks and interests, solidarity will become a global expression of the preferential option for the poor. That will re-affirm development strategies that give priority to basic needs in economic organization and help mobilize the increasing global consensus to create new international systems and institutions on a new ethical basis.

3.4 The Case for Development as a "Human Right"

The fourth rethinking of development ethics is based on the proposition that the development of the whole person and of all peoples is a human right (JW 16). The right to development demands the respect and promotion of all other rights as its "necessary condition" and "sure guarantee" (cf. SRS 15, 44). Included in that collective right are the rights to culture (LC 92) and to a safe environment. The rethinking is justified by the religious or theological

view that the goods of the earth have a universal purpose (cf. QA 45). If such goods are for each and everyone in the present and future generations to use for their human development, then the unequal access and sharing of these goods is an affront to humanity while the destruction of the ecosystem, being the natural matrix of resources, is a threat to the value of life itself.

Compared to the first two generations of human rights such as civil-political liberties and socio-economic rights, collective rights such as development, culture and ecology are saddled with problems.

3.4.1 The Problem of Consensus

The articulation of fundamental human aspirations, such as justice and participation, into the language of rights continues to evolve. From its earliest moorings in the Enlightenment project to protect the individual from the tyranny of the state, and well into its first appropriation in Catholic social thought (PT 9-27), the list has continued to expand in response to concrete negative experiences. In fact, there has been in the last decades the trend to multiply moral claims using the language of rights and the tendency "to define nearly every public issue in terms of legally protected rights of individuals."[39]

This difficulty is exacerbated by the underlying fundamental differences among cultures. For instance, the social system of traditional societies is marked more by the intimate and personalized links of the individual with the social sub-systems of the family, clan or kinship than by the category of the rights of the individual central to the dynamism of modern constitutional states. In this sense, it may not be easy to arrive at a meaningful consensus on a set of human rights.

3.4.2 The Problem of Order of Priority

What is more difficult to achieve is an agreement on the order of priority. If coherence is necessary, human rights theory must be

39. Amitai Etzioni, "Vritues in Democracy," in Oliver Williams and John Houck (eds.), *Catholic Social Thought and the New World Order* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 285-297; here at 286.

able to adjudicate the rules of preference in situations when rights come into conflict. To decide which rights are more important that others is exceedingly difficult because, first of all, "it is fraught with personal, cultural and political bias." To make matters worse, there is the seeming "improbability of reaching a meaningful consensus." It is easier to agree on "a set of rights than on the order of priority to govern them."[40]

3.4.3 The Problems of Standards, Subject and Content

The most complicated challenge however is how to resolve those rights that are claims of a collectivity and not of an individual. The moral argument of the right to development is a classic example in that it is problematic in terms of the standards, subject and content of its claim.[41]

Human rights as a moral language remain an empty rhetoric without juridical framework, institutional standards and legal enforcement. But how should global standards be determined when the right at stake is that of a collectivity? One proposal is to bring together all juridical documents on human rights or their equivalents in other cultures into a network so that standards can converge and be combined. This can be facilitated by intercultural forum that ensures democratic processes to prevent the domination of a particular culture, religion or nation. A centralized "lawgiver" does not appear necessary as it relies on the dynamic character of people's rights and values their different expressions and emphases. This may not be easy at all, but at least it shows that juridical contours and democratic standards are necessary.

Who should be the subject or carrier of the claim of this right? It can readily be assumed that it is the human person, being at once

40. Thomas Hoppe, "Menschenrechte als Basis eines Welthethos?," in Marianne Heimbach-Steins, Andreas Lienkamp und Joachim Wiemeyer, eds., *Brennpunkt Sozialethik*, 319-333; here at 329.

41. See, for instance, Heiner Bielefeldt, "Menschenrechtliche Universalität und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit," in Andre Habisch und Ulrich Pöner, eds., *Signale der Solidarität*, 31-47.

the agent of development and the beneficiary. But the abstractness of the subject would make it vulnerable to ideological interpretation, particularly in contexts where democratic institutions are weak if not absent. Recent history continues to show how authoritarian regimes gain and solidify their rule and privilege or mask their record of human rights abuses using the right to development of their people as pretext. The alibi has in fact become a bit sophisticated as can be seen in the practice of subordinating political rights of individual citizens or the economic rights of individual workers to the collective right to development of the nation-state.

Finally, what is the precise content of the right? There has been a consensus among human rights theorists that, for the right to development to acquire specific content, it should not be divorced from its economic, social, political, cultural and institutional conditions. But that does not seem to be always true in official development politics of powerful nations. The human rights clause is employed as "conditionality" in development cooperation and solidarity. Its logic means withholding development aid and/or refusing to establish trade with or imposing trade sanctions on nations perceived as human rights violators.

Such *Konditionalisierung*, as Bielefeldt calls it, contains anti-human and anti-poor impulses. When, for instance, it is imposed on a poor nation whose regime is perceived as abusive, the negative effects are most strongly felt at the grassroots majority while the few who are responsible suffer a little international embarrassment. Concretely it means more deprivation of the poor for it can destroy what may be little development gains made at the base.

More destructive is the naked double-standard application of rights in development cooperation. There is reluctance if not timidity to apply conditionalities on strong nations despite their records of human rights abuses (e.g. China) and the ease with which sanctions are imposed on weaker nations which also have a string of abuses to its name (e.g., North Korea, Myanmar). This dilemma shows the extent to which development as a collective right is very vulnerable and needs to be submitted to continuous revision.

3.5 The Case for "Sustainable Development"

The last approach to rethink development ethics seeks to correct the fundamental defect of earlier development theories and strategies. While previous models assumed all too easily the limitless capacity of the planet to provide for human needs and wants, the case for sustainable development does not. Instead it strongly argues for an environmentally-sound coordination of the economic process based on the capacity of the ecological system, on the one hand, and of the social process of balancing the development of the socio-economies of peoples in an integral manner, on the other.[42]

Having primarily evolved as a critique against modern technological and economic rationality and ethos, the project shows the expansion of the scope of moral responsibility so as to include if not make central the integrity of non-human realities and the quality of life of future generations. In a sense, it is based on an ethical reflection that seeks to render a cogent account of the mutual link and influence of two non-identical spheres, namely: the "primary ecology" which consists of the "natural foundations of life" and the "secondary ecology" which refers to the "sphere of human culture and civilization"[43] or as John Paul would put it, "natural ecology" and "human ecology" (cf. CA 37-38; SRS 34).

3.5.1 Giving Moral Content to the Biblical Vision of Creation

The Judaeo-Christian view of the integrity of creation does not contain an explicit ethics of creation and an ethics of the environment suited to present needs. At best, the biblical understanding contains a framework for an appreciation of the relations between human and

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42. See SRS 34; see also Wilhelm Korff, "Dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung. Zur Frage eines Umweltethos der Zukunft," in Marianne Heimbach-Steins, Andreas Lienkamp und Joachim Wiemeyer, eds., *Brennpunkt Sozialethik*, 419-436.

43. Hans Münk, "Umweltverantwortung und christliche Theologie. Forschungsbericht zu neuen deutschsprachigen Beiträgen im Blick auf eine umweltethische Grundkonzeption," in Ibid., 385-402.

natural ecology. It does not offer concrete norms for action. The effort to derive an understanding of moral responsibility from such a religious view has evolved into at least four directions.[44]

One direction, the "transparency of the world", sees creation as an aesthetic reality and advances the category of "beauty" as a biblical theme in the same breath as justice and peace which are moral demands of God's reign. A second one, the "sacramentality of the world" approach construes creation as the universal sacrament of God, a position based on the argument that God's immanence is somehow reflected in the human-natural ecological structure of the world, and hence deserving of reverence and respect. A third approach, the "theology of responsibility", grounds moral responsibility for the future of the ecosystem on one's faithful trust that, despite conflicts, ambivalence and sin, history and humanity are secure in the all-embracing love of God who himself, in Christ, took responsibility for humanity. Whereas the last, the "feminist theology" model, provides a critical insight that there is a close connection between the history of the Christian interpretation of the Scripture, with its androcentrism and bias against women, and the modern and contemporary understanding of nature, with its accompanying destructive consequences to the environment.

The preceding approaches do not directly lead into concrete ecologically responsible plans of action so crucial for transformative development strategies. Nonetheless, the frameworks that they provide are important for birthing an ecological ethos, that is, a way of living, models of action and a system of motivation that can bring into coherence the requirements of total human development with the innate worth of the ecosystem. Without such ethos, as the succeeding discussion will try to show, the future of a sustainable development will be bleak.

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44. The views are from the German-speaking contexts. See Ibid., 389-393 citing the views of C. Link (transparency of the world), Kurt Koch (sacramentality of creation), Josef Rommelts (theology of responsibility), and the consensus among its feminist theologians. For similar views from the Spanish-speaking Europe, see Joan Carrera i Carrera and Jose Gonzales Faus, "The Kyoto Horizon: The Problem of Environment," *Cristianisme i Justicia* 122 (March 2006): 1-32.

3.5.2 The Ethos of an "Integral Responsibility"

A very crucial component of an ecological ethos, according to the proponents of this rethinking, is the formation of a consciousness that continuously seeks to understand the complexity of the ecosystem in order to manage it responsibly.[45] In this process, moral knowledge does not abstain from the insights of the natural sciences while moral competence does not exclude the responsible use of instruments that alter reality. What is therefore sought is an interior unity between the moral growth of the agent as far as responsible use of freedom is concerned and the socio-economic development of his/her being in reference to the use of modern technology. In effect, it tries to bridge the gap that separates the ethical competence and technical reason of the one moral agent.

But is the gap between technical rationality and ethical competence bridgeable? Not a few would take the pessimistic stance and thus abhor the principle of technological advancement altogether. But the optimistic view argues that, despite the record of culpable and harmful conduct towards the ecosystem, the human person has demonstrated the capacity of ethical management of technological processes. If that is the case, the moral question rather is: how far has the human person matured as an ethical subject and a moral agent in the context of an ever-progressing techno-scientific culture?

The question is very important for ethical rethinking because an inquiry into the moral development of persons need not be confined to individual convictions, patterns of behavior, and lifestyles. The scope of ethical inquiry on development policies should also include the technological instruments that humanity has created for its own advancement as well as the structures and institutions that legitimize such instrumentalities. An ecological ethos true to its name should not excuse itself from asking whether or not there is moral development intimately woven into these instruments, structures and institutions.

The person is seen, in this optimistic proposal, as capable of acting instrumentally in a moral way even as s/he is capable of

45. See Wilhelm Korff, "Dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung," 423-426.

fashioning a techno-scientific culture that embodies a well-formed and well-informed conscience. What is needed, it seems, is the formation of an "ethos of integral responsibility" (*Ethos der integrierter Verantwortung)*, one which validates the learning process, gives space to human creativity for the morally tenable and possible, and shapes a climate of interdisciplinary discourse among carriers of complementary competence and responsibility.

3.5.3 The Ethos of "Self-Restriction and Human Sufficiency"

Besides an ethos of integral responsibility, the theory and praxis of "sustainable development" also needs an "ethos of self-restriction" or the readiness to accept and appreciate restrictions of possibilities in view of the indubitable yet often repressed fact that we live in a finite world.[46] It tries to promote as a norm for action the "appropriateness of acquiring a growing awareness" that one cannot use with impunity the other living and inanimate beings simply as one would wish, according to one's own economic needs (cf. SRS 34).

But the proposal is relevant all the more in view of two questions. First, the question of moral motivation: what motivates the human person from abstaining from and/or restricting his/her possibilities? Second, the question of ascetic capacity: is the human person capable of living with what is enough? The proper adjudication of both could either spell success or failure to a development that wishes to be sustainable.

To limit the many possibilities that technological rationality can offer would certainly be taken as something undesirable by acting persons. In fact, given the current development gap, restrictions can be used as an ideological tool to prevent poor peoples from legitimately claiming their emancipation from hunger and want. But on the other hand, an ethos of self-restriction and living with enough shows that human beings alone have the moral capacity to prevent the ecological problem from reaching its limits before it will be too late.

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46. See H. Münk, "Umweltverantwortung und christliche Theologie," 393 and W. Korff, "Dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung," 432-436.

Moral motivation and ascetic capacity thus hold the key in nurturing a new ethical sensibility - one that validates self-restriction and living with enough not only as key ecological virtues for the preservation of creation's integrity but also as constitutive of the self-worth of the ethical subject and/or moral agent. The capacity to accept restrictions and, at the same time, cultivate the attitude of living with enough does not lie much on the ecological risks and dangers as on the subjective appreciation of these risks by the moral agent.

"This may mean," in the concrete, "making important changes in established lifestyles," on the one hand, and institutionalizing ecologically-enhancing and environmentally sound instrumentalities, on the other, "in order to limit the waste of environmental and human resources, thus enabling every individual, and all the peoples of the earth to have sufficient share of those resources" (CA 52). A culture of self-control, asceticism, personal sacrifice and simplicity of life is not pre-modern at all. A truly sustainable development is possible only if these moral virtues become motivational factors that determine key choices in production, consumption, technology use, and innovation.

3.5.4 The Ethos of Stewardship as "Solidarity with Fellow Creatures"

While the two preceding models emphasize duties and responsibilities, the ethos of stewardship is founded strongly on the rights and interests of the *anthropos* but carefully interpreted against the biblical horizon of stewardship. The logic is, being the crown of creation and the addressee of God's salvific self-communication in Christ, the human person is the only subject with moral rights and responsibilities. But this Christian anthropocentrism has to a certain extent contributed to the ecological disaster. In fact Catholic social teaching acknowledges that "at the root of the senseless destruction of the natural environment is an anthropological error…Instead of carrying out his role as cooperator with God in the work of creation, man sets himself up in place of God and thus ends up provoking a rebellion on the part of nature, which more tyrannized than governed by him" (CA 37).

To correct this error, a shift from an "anthropo-centric" to "anthropo-relational" stewardship is thus proposed. It means that, while it is a revealed truth that the human being is the crown of creation, it is equally as revealed that s/he is and remains a "co-creature" and, sharing this same dignity with the other beings that constitute the natural world, s/he is intimately related to them. To recognize that s/he is a derivative of, and dependent on, an ecosystem in the vast web of evolutionary life require major changes in attitudes and awareness. Still retaining his/her role as the God-appointed steward, the *anthropos* is to "act in such a way that the consequences of his/her behavior do not destroy the appropriate life-capacity and integrity of humanity and non-human nature."[47] This s/he will fulfill no longer as an exercise of dominion over all but as expression of "creaturely solidarity" (*kreaturlicher Solidarität*), that is to say, a solidarity that proceeds from the awareness of being a co-creature, a dignity that s/he shares with the other creatures.

Human stewardship over non-human beings is not rejected. It is rather subjected to a corrective in order to free it from a human responsibility understood as absolute dominion and centrism. Freed from its destructive embrace, stewardship can now be fastened on more comprehensive and life-enhancing mooring of creaturely solidarity.

3.5.5 An Ethos Founded on the Self-worth of "Non-Human" Beings?

One more interesting proposal to buttress the case for sustainable development is the recognition that "beings which constitute the natural world" (SRS 34) have their own inherent self-worth. If human rights are recognized as expression and consequence of human dignity and self-worth, the rights of nature, living or non-living, are also in the same breath. Inasmuch as "non-human beings" have their self-worth as God's creation, they have fundamental rights.[48] An integral part of human responsibility is to respect these rights, such as the

47 . H. Münk, "Umweltverantwortung und christliche Theologie," 398.

48. In this regard there are three clusters of claims: "pathocentrism" which recognizes all animals as capable of sensation or feeling as carrier of moral rights;

right to existence and the protection of its ecosystem, species and population in their symbiotic relations.

An ethos of this sort shall have implications of radical and revisionist proportions. It would, for instance, mean that nature, with its rights and needs, becomes the norm for the social organization of human ecology. All of ethical reflection will have ecology as the primary and all-embracing paradigm "from which social ethical categories are to be defined" and the fundamental framework where moral imperatives stand and from where they are to be communicated.[49] The moral quality of human responsibility may also be measured in terms of one's promotion and defense of nature's rights.

But will it not be ideological to fix moral discourse and communication in ecology? In other words, under which consideration should we recognize nature and its rights to be the all-embracing paradigm of moral discussion? While it is beyond the scope of this paper to present an answer, it suffices to say that this issue clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of traditional categories or classical concepts of ethics to describe the relationship between human and non-human beings. Even the conventional differentiation between the so-called "personal" and "non-personal" spheres suffers the same fate. The category of "sustainability" is therefore a challenge for ethical reflection to provide a grammar that can communicate the meaning and value of the totality of the conditions for human development to be authentic and integral.

3.6 Critical Summary

In view of the preceding discussions, the following observations are noteworthy:

Catholic development ethics, as embodied in Church social teaching and practiced by movements inspired and/or guided by it, has shifted its profile from a normative to a hermeneutic discipline.

"biocentrism" which considers all forms of life as beings with moral rights; and the "holistic" view that extends moral rights even to non-living spheres of nature. See H. Münk, "Umweltverantwortung und christliche Theologie," 393-398.

49. Ibid., 399-400.

What has been known as the "social question" or, later on, "social concerns" is now less connected to an ideal "social order" or normative theory of society but more to the integral development of the human being in the specificity and contingency of his/her cultural context and ethical/moral capacity. If the old approach asked: "what are the principles and norms for organizing social life that can alleviate the common good?," the focus now shifts towards: "how can the human person discover the dignity of his/her origin and destiny, and, in discovering them, how can s/he develop to the full his/her freedom and potentials?"[50] The preceding surveys converge to show the preference for the latter approach as the search for a more comprehensive normative basis of development ethics continues.

This does not however signal an abandonment of its normative character. Catholic development ethics still relies on the traditional categories of justice, universal destination of goods, common good and solidarity. But as they are set free from their highly scholastic framework, they become thoroughly enriched and rendered more relevant, thanks to their re-reading in the more phenomenological-existential ambit of development theories and the more cosmic-conscious framework of ecological sciences.[51]

The praxis is thus ongoing to overcome the narrowness of a development theory that views reality as a social organization exclusively determined by the state and the market. If in previous development decades the categories of ethos and culture have been evidently underestimated if not abandoned as point of reference in the construction of a development economy and polity, it is observable how intense recent church social teaching and current

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50. Luis S. Garcia, "El significando de la sociologia de la cultura en la reflexion de los aspectos epistemologicos de la doctrina social," in *America Latina y la doctrina social de la Iglesia. Dialogo latinoamericano-aleman, Tomo I: Reflexiones metodologicas*, eds. Peter Hünermann and Juan Carlos Scannone, (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Paulinas, 1991), 197-207; here, 201.

51. Fine examples of such re-reading are found in Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Globalization and the Common Good" and James Hug, "Economic Justice and Globalization" in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope*, eds., John Coleman and William Ryan, 42-54 and 55-71, respectively.

ethical rethinking are engaged in a critique of modernity and technical rationality to arrest that fundamental deficiency.[52]

There is nonetheless a link, perhaps missing or, better still, weak, that both Catholic ethics of development and current rethinking have yet to rigorously address. It pertains to praxis, particularly the type of ethical praxis that corresponds to what is demanded in the global village or international community of nations. Ethical praxis by nature has two interactive directions. One is directed towards achieving ethical judgment and the other, the practical concretization of correct judgment through various modes such as institutional set-ups, juridical frameworks, and socio-cultural contexts.

Based on the preceding discussion, Catholic development ethics is strong on the former but weak on the latter. It needs to be complemented or enriched by a serious account of the network of ethical judgments, forms of praxis, movements of solidarity, and programs of action that seek to provide a countervailing force to resist from and/or rectify the so-called "mechanisms of sin" as well as ethos-forms and styles of life alternative and in contrast to the modes of living propagated by the so-called "culture of death."[53]

These initial observations derived mainly from the "center" need to be verified on the standpoint of those at the periphery of development, particularly Asia.

4. Implications and Convergences of the Rethinking in Asian Contexts

"Asia is the earth's largest continent and is home to nearly two-thirds of the world's population…" Its peoples are "heirs to ancient cultures, religions and traditions" and it has an "intricate mosaic of

52. See, for instance, Joe Holland, "Towards a Global Culture of Life: Cultural Challenges to Catholic Social Thought in the Postmodern Electronic-Ecological Era," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought,* 113-129.

53. For an account of the possibility these various signs of hope to congeal into an effective global civil society, see R. Scott Appleby, "Global Civil Society and the Catholic Social Teaching Tradition," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought*, 130-140.

its many cultures, languages, beliefs and traditions, which comprise such a substantial part of the history and patrimony of the human family" (*Ecclesia in Asia, 6*). The economic, social and political realities are "very diverse" and "highly complex", defying any simple classification (*Ecclesia in Asia, 7-8*).

Aware of such magnitude and without pretending to be exhaustive this paper will sum up in five broad strokes how the Asian context could critique and enrich the ongoing rethinking of development ethics as outlined in the previous discussions.

4.1 Development as a Quest for Identity in a Global Village

What is Asia? What is an Asian? If the legacies of colonialism and neo-colonialism that *Populorum Progressio* (PP 7, 9, 10, 57 & PP 8, 9, 52, 57-58) speaks about is taken seriously, Asia could be just another "social construct" or a "negative other", an identity imposed *from without*. If Asian identity is arrived at through the prism of new paradigms of development using Human Development Indices, Asia is an experience by which its peoples continue to measure small ripples of joys and hopes in an ocean of miseries and frustrations. If identity is defined by belonging to a political unit called nation-state, Asia is a homeland of stateless persons eternally displaced by war or of communities bruised by one calamity after another or of millions trying to eke out an existence at the margins. If identity is built on the laws of commodification and consumption, Asia is a huge market of cheap labor, including women and children, a vast sea of consumers, a haven of global corporate profit, if not a paradise of almost everything exotic.

If this craving for identity is partly a reaction to the insecurity generated by predatory globalization, Asia is a promise to pursue a community of diverse identities through regional groupings (e.g., Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia). But if the craving could not be sufficiently answered by such transnational public spaces, the tempting alternative is to construct an identity based on isolationist if not bellicose nationalism (e.g., the geo-political rivalries of India and Pakistan; the rise of "new nationalism" in Japan and the threat it poses to China and Korea) or on religious fundamentalism if not

fanaticism (e.g., in Southern Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, etc.).

The list could go on. The reality called "Asia" elicits a variety of emotional and intellectual responses, depending on different perspectives and commitments. The dream of constructing a Community of Asia *from within* and *from below* is becoming increasingly alive in the discourse of public intellectuals[54] and of religious scholars.[55] Asia continues to struggle "to have more" of justice, development and liberation in this era of globalization.[56] But "moving from less human to more human conditions" (cf. PP 20-21) is for Asians more than a question of ethics or techniques, more than an issue of existence or survival. It is above all a question of identity, that is, a question of discovering and affirming our sense of "being Asian" from within the "innate spiritual insight and moral wisdom in the Asian soul" (*Ecclesia in Asia, 6*).

Rethinking Catholic development ethics in Asia should have a more sustained reflection on this "growing sense of being Asian"

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54. Began in 1996, the Asia Leadership Fellow Program is an annual project that brings together "public intellectuals of Asia, not only to think through what it means to be one in this part of the world today but also eventually to shape a community of intellectuals committed to spreading an awareness of, and even defining accurately, being in Asia and being Asian." For the collection of its discourses, confer Urvashi Butalia et al., eds., *The Community of Asia: Concept or Reality* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2006).

55. Confer, for instance, the proceedings of an international conference on "Ethics and Economics: The Challenge of Development in Southeast Asia and the Contribution of Christian Communities" organized by the International Jacques Maritain Institute and held in Jakarta (Indonesia) on November 27-December 1, 1990 that, perhaps for the first time, extensively reflected upon the great Asian religions and economics. See, Roberto Papini and Vincenzo Buonomo, eds., *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in Asia* (Manila: New City Press, 1993). A follow-up international symposium on "Development and Poverty: The Call of the Catholic Church in Asia" organized by the same Institute was held in Manila in 1994.

56. For a panoramic view of the struggle, see Thomas Hong-Soon, "Moral Challenges and the Church in Asia Today, with a Specific Consideration of Korea", Agnes Brazal, "Globalization and Catholic Theological Ethics: A Southeast Asian Perspective" and Clement Campos, "Doing Christian Ethics in India's World of Cultural Complexity and Social Inequality" in *Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church*, ed. James Keenan, (New York: Continuum, 2007), 65-73, 74-81, and 82-90, respectively.

and, like a gardener, facilitate its full flowering. Hence the normative question: "what patterns should (Asian) communities in the 21st century follow if they still want to offer individuals their own identity?"[57]

4.2 Civil Society in Asia: Global Countervailing Force or a New Mode of Development Aid Dependence?

In recent decades, the continent of Asia has seen non-state actors or non-government organizations (NGOs) not only increasing in numbers but also heightening their standards of human dignity, improving their creativity, widening their reach and advocacy, and networking more efficiently. While mainstream discourse easily labels them as civil society, beyond the nomenclature their identities and praxis are not as homogeneous.

If typology is helpful, there are the "critical engagers" or those who operate in partnership with government and business to get things done, and are thus saddled with the duty to continually discern whether these partnerships are opportunities for transformation or traps of co-optation. There are also "rejectionists" or those who refuse to have anything to do with the state and the market in order to create a truly radical alternative. They feel they have the duty to suspect if not critique their colleagues due to what they perceive as ties with imperialism and its local clients, their ideology of adaptation to neo-liberalism, and their authoritarian and elitist structures.[58]

Many if not most civil society groups in Asia would visualize themselves as the "other sector" (culture) that can act as a useful countervailing force to redirect the state (polity) towards greater democratization, as in South Korea and Cambodia,[59] or to re-orient

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57. The question is borrowed from Joan Carrera i Carrera, "Identities for the 21st Century," *Cristianisme i Justicia* 127 (November 2007): 1-32.

58. For this typology see, Nicanor Perlas, *Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding* (Quezon City: Center for Alternative Development Initiatives, 2000), xxv and James Petras and Henry Veltmyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 128-138.

59. For the role of civil society in holding accountable South Korea's dictators, see Won-Soon Park, "A Decade of Change: NGO Development in Korea (1987-

the market (economy) towards genuine justice and comprehensive development, as in Indonesia and the Philippines.[60]

Some are starting to envision, not just the cultural sphere but the whole of society or the local community to become "civil" through the mainstreaming of indigenous cultural and spiritual values into the polity and economy,[61] such as the Buddhist Asoke community in eastern Thailand whose way of life is founded "to prefer merit or virtue" (*bunniyom*) as opposed "to prefer capital" (*tun niyom*)[62] or the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka[63] or the "lifestyle of sustainable sufficiency" (*sapat*) advocated by the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC) movement of Catholic religious communities in Asia.[64]

1997)," in *The Community of Asia: Concept or Reality*, Urvashi Butalia et al., eds., 135-155; for its role in institutionalizing the media's freedom of expression in Cambodia, see Samnang Ham, "International Assistance for Media Institution-Building," in *idem,* 156-184.

60. For instance, the Philippine Agenda 21 launched in 1996 to comply with its commitment to Global Agenda 21 agreed upon during the Earth Summit in Brazil in 1992, and the "eight-point equality policy" of Pancasila Economics adopted by the Indonesian government in the late 1980s to correct development programs that were too centralized and to ensure development with equity, social justice and respect of human dignity. See Nicanor Perlas, *Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding*, 177-194 and Mubyarto, "Pancasila Economic System, Its Feature and Conceptual Basis," in *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in Asia,* Roberto Papini and Vincenzo Buonomo, eds., 61-73.

61. Confer what Perlas calls the process of "threefolding" in Nicanor Perlas, *Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding*, 1-26.

62. Laddawan Tantivitayapitak, "Reviving Democracy: Treading the Buddhist Asoke Path," in *The Community of Asia: Concept or Reality*, 214-219. *Bunniyom* economics of the Asoke Buddhist movement rests on four principles: a) selling items at a low profit; b) trading for equal value (no profit); c) charging the lowest possible prices; and d) giving away items for free whenever possible.

63. Based on Buddhist values of giving and service, the *Sarvodaya* (which means Welfare of All) movement has brought material improvements to thousands of Sri Lankan Villages. See Kamla Chowdry, "The Sarvodaya Movement in Sri Lanka," quoted in Wendy Tyndale, "Some Reflections on a Dialogue Between the World's Religions and the World Bank with Reference to Catholic Social Thought," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope*, 157-171; here, 162.

64. "The rich must live simply so that the poor may simply live," so goes the dictum of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary in the Philippines to live and

There are thousands more! In the midst of this diversity, crucial questions need to be raised: What is the implicit image of civil society that current development politics use? What is the implicit image of development that civil society organizations use? What, if any, are the implicit ethical impulses and vision in this image?

Rethinking Catholic development ethics needs to reflect on civil society's diverse identities and origins, its various theories and forms of praxis, and evaluate its ethical impact on Asian communities for the purposes of prophetic critique, mutual enrichment and/or practical collaboration. Only then can one determine whether what is emerging is simply a new mode of development aid dependence or a real countervailing force that empowers Asians in development discourse and strategies.

4.3 The Deep Impact of Religions on Asian Economies, Polities and Cultures

If development is for all in Asia, it forces its peoples to confront their complexity and heterogeneity, which are not only due to the different stages of economic development or political situations, but above all from profoundly diverse cultures and the influence these different cultures exert on their societies. The people of Asia are one in taking pride in their religious, spiritual and cultural values. Given the fact that values are known and transmitted, not by way of scientific research, but by acceptance and adherence, the task of rethinking development ethics is also at once cultural and religious.

A recurring theme in the Episcopal documents in Asia is the recognition that the rapid economic and social transformation of Asia by capitalism "have led to a breakdown in the traditional patterns of community economics" and "a crises in the traditional system of values."[65] But capitalism need not get all of the blame if not suspicion.

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preach a life of sustainable sufficiency. *Sapat* is the Filipino word for "enough" or "sufficient". JPIC is a worldwide effort of religious orders and societies of the Roman Catholic Church to re-image their prophetic identity and mission wherever they are located. See the *Manual for Promoters of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1998).

65. See the final report of the conference in Roberto Papini and Vincenzo Buonomo, eds., *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in*

Studies on the impact of the great religions (e.g., Confusianism,[66] Shintoism,[67] Buddhism,[68] Hinduism,[69] Islam[70] and Christianity) on the economic, and not just social and political, behavior of individuals and groups found out that "a critical attitude to a doctrine and the values it transmits is not evident in some religious traditions, in which there does not seem to be a very efficient in-built mechanism of self-criticism."[71]

Christian churches, on the other hand, do have a tradition of "prophetic charism" as a means for listening to what the Spirit has to say to the Churches themselves and also as a critical function with regard to socio-economic realities. But it has been observed that

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Asia, 245-257; here, 251. For the documents of the Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences (FABC), see Gaudencio Rosales and Catalino Arevalo, eds., *For All Peoples of Asia: FABC Documents, 1970-1991* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1992) and Franz-Josef Eilers, ed., *For All Peoples of Asia: FABC Documents, 1992-1996* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1997).

66. "It is, above all, the emerging elite of the Asian countries that identify with the Confucian ethic" particularly the puritan values that Max Weber counts among the reasons for the rise of capitalism in the West such as discipline, dedication to work, saving, sobriety, renunciation, loyalty to superior, and great interest in money. See Vincenzo Buonomo, "Final Report," in *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in Asia*, 249-250, and Daniel Ross, "Confucianism and Economics: The Case of Taiwan," in *idem*, 50-60.

67. See Richard Gardner, "Religion and Economic Development in Japan," in *idem*, 74-95. "Shintoism acts as a salve for social tensions, encourages company loyalty and, above all, emphasizes the value of work," says the "Final Report," 249.

68. See S.M. Rashid, "Buddhist Economics: Middle Path Economics," in *idem*, 30-41. Aiming to fully liberate the person from inner anguish, Buddhism "induces its followers to neglect the material world," thus "the profit motive is of minor importance," says the "Final Report," 249.

69. See I. B. Oka Puni Atmaja, "Hinduism and Economics," in *idem*, 42-49. Hinduism "emphasizes success of the group and the community" and can thus correct individual behavior, even in the economy, for the benefit of the community. See "Final Report," 249.

70. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam and Economics," in *idem,* 19-29. "Ethics, religion and politics form an indivisible whole" in Islam, hence "ethical and religious imperatives are the basis of unifying social, political and economic behavior." While economics enjoys full autonomy in western countries, it does not have such in Islam. "Final Report," 249.

71.Arij Roest Crollius, "Concluding Remarks," in *idem,* 239-242; here, 241.

"this prophetic charism is always exposed to the danger of being oppressed by doctrinal apologetics."[72] "Catholic communities in Asia are a minority" thus making it "difficult for the (church) documents to become widely known, while the documents themselves encounter serious linguistic problems when addressed to Asian societies as a whole." Even inside Catholic communities themselves, the documents are little known, "as they are thought to be important only for the pastoral work for the church"[73] and not also for regional or global networking and collaboration with other faiths.[74]

The rethinking of Catholic development ethics then has to foster sustained dialogue with other faiths and systematic studies of their impact on the social, economic and political development of the Asian countries. Through this the "critiques of mainstream development policies offered by people of different faith traditions who are working with, and rooted in, materially impoverished communities" may "provide insights into the possibility of a different way of ordering our lives."[75]

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72. Ibid. The tension between charity and justice is a case in point. In 1984, for instance, when local priests and nuns in Kerala (South India) led to fasting unto death to support Kerala's fishermen's rights against trawler fishing, the bishops of the region issued a ban for others to join. See Lucas Thumma, "The Catholic Church and Economics: India," in *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in Asia*, 120-142.

73. Vincenzo Buonomo, "Final Report," 255. A six-year research project of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) and the Jacques Maritain Institute showed that "the considerable amount of work was done in relative isolation, without any real dialogue between experts, and what is more, no one knew anything about most of the documents, in spite of the brave efforts of a few bishops and specialist reviews." See the conclusions of an international colloquium "Ethics, Economics and Development: Episcopal Teaching from the Five Continents" (Fribourg, April 1-3, 1993), Document No. 3, 1-13; here, 6.

74. "Considering Catholicism's size, global reach and armory of rich theoretical and institutional resources," why has it remained marginalized in globalization campaigns and debates? For a survey of answers, confer John Coleman, "Making the Connections: Globalization and Catholic Social Thought," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope*, 9-27; here, 24-26.

75. Wendy Tyndale, "Some Reflections on a Dialogue Between the World's Religions and the World Bank with Reference to Catholic Social Thought," 157 and 171. The dialogue will bring searching questions to all, says Tyndale. For one, "people from different religions have never before attempted to arrive at a consensual

4.4 A New Pedagogy and Spirituality of Ethical Behavior in Socio-economic Affairs

Catholic discourse and practice on development in Asia have been consistent and courageous in asserting that human development is never a merely technical or economic question; it is fundamentally a question of human, moral and ethical values (cf. *Ecclesia in Asia*, 32). The individual capacity to choose and respond to values that are deeply human and ethical is very crucial. Even if choices are exacerbated or mitigated by external and complex factors, and even if they bear on social realities, "ethical choices are always choices of the individual person." Hence, a pedagogy of conscience is very necessary: one that constantly shapes this capacity to appreciate and respond to ethical and human values.

The Asian context however reminds us that the formation of a conscience that responds to these values is not the monopoly of Christian ethics or Catholic morality. In Asia, ethics is not always understood as a rigorous elaboration of a set of explicit, universal and rational standards. It rather stands for the moral and symbolic life of a community or a religious tradition which nonetheless contains a different way of reflecting on deeply human and ethical problems.

Neither should such pedagogy be a monopoly of Asia's different religious traditions. A non-discerning affirmation of their respective set of values and symbols does not augur well for a development that is truly human and ethical. There is always the danger for these religious traditions, like the Christian religion, to end up, either intentionally or unintentionally, legitimizing and supporting the devastating costs of modernization or development.[76]

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definition of development," 161. Also "they will need to balance the tension between their vision of development" and "openness to the improvements that modern technology can bring to the material well-being of those who suffer most" as well as learn "how to engage with the powerful institutions of this world while holding fast to (their) wisdom," 170.

76. "If there is a single key explaining Japan's success, it would probably be the tendency in Japan to identify religion and state or, put it differently, the ability of the state to orchestrate the different religious traditions of Japan," says Gardner. And the costs had been very high. See R. Gardner, "Religion and Economic Development in Japan," 89-90.

Rethinking development ethics in Asia has to "become more vividly aware of the need for spiritual masters in the socio-economic field, whether they are inspired by a religious humanism or by a secular humanism. Their task would be the formulation of a spirituality of ethical behavior in socio-economic matters"[77] drinking from the wellspring of their mystical and religious traditions.

4.5 The Need for an Ecumenical and Effective Strategy for a Global Common Good

But on the other hand, an appeal for ethically-inspired individual choices and behavior will certainly not produce the desired results "if some of the rules of the international economic game are not changed, if nothing is done to change those mechanisms that generate distortions and structural inequality."[78] Besides being a question of values and behavior, it is also a question of strategy and efficacy. "One becomes more aware of certain aspects of truth," says church social teaching, by making reference to the praxis and experiences of "those who work directly for evangelization and for the advancement of the poor and the oppressed" (LN XI:13). The greatest challenge now, it seems, is to find effective and innovative ways to continue repositioning Catholic development ethics on the standpoint of the victim and translate that standpoint more fully into effective action networks and interface ecumenically with other

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77. Arij Roest Crollius, "Concluding Remarks," in *Ethics and Economics: Religions, Development and Liberation in Asia*, 242. "The first great postmodern challenge to Catholic social teaching appears in the foundational area of spirituality," says Joe Holland, "Toward a Global Culture of Life: Cultural Challenges to Catholic Social Thought in the Postmodern Electronic-Ecological Era," in *Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope*, 125.

78. See the conclusions of an international colloquium "Ethics, Economics and Development: Episcopal Teaching from the Five Continents," (Fribourg, April 1-3, 1993), Document No. 3, 13. Interpretation… Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are "found", not "made"…. The objective historian's role is that of a neutral or disinterested judge. Thus, the belief that the past could be reconstructed empirically through an assiduous reading of documents remained the central tenet.

traditions and movements not only for drastic reforms in the so-called rules of the game but more so for a global ethics for a global world.

By Way of Conclusion

Another world is possible! As long as, taking faith in and pinning its hopes on Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth and the life, Catholic development ethics continue to give primacy to the last, the lost, and the least (Mt. 25) as it perseveringly creates new wineskins into which the new wine is poured (Lk. 5:37-38).

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